The Social Contract in Modern Democratic Theory
An exploration of the legacy of the social contract tradition in modern democratic theory, from Rawls to contemporary debates about political legitimacy.
The social contract tradition of political thought, developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant, has had a profound influence on the development of modern democratic theory. The basic claim of the tradition — that political authority is legitimate only to the extent that it rests on the consent of the governed — has become a basic principle of contemporary political thought. This article examines the legacy of the social contract tradition in modern democratic theory, from John Rawls to the contemporary debates about political legitimacy.
The Tradition Renewed: John Rawls
The most important contemporary version of the social contract tradition is the theory of justice developed by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993). Rawls’s theory is, in important respects, a renewal of the contractarian tradition, and it has had a profound influence on the subsequent development of contemporary political philosophy.
Rawls develops his theory through the device of the “original position,” a hypothetical situation in which the principles of justice are chosen by rational individuals behind a “veil of ignorance” that prevents them from knowing their particular circumstances in society. The veil of ignorance ensures that the principles of justice are chosen impartially, without regard to the particular interests of any individual or group.
The principles of justice that Rawls derives from the original position are two: the principle of equal basic liberties, which guarantees to each citizen the same basic rights and liberties; and the difference principle, which permits social and economic inequalities only if they are attached to positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and only if they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.
The two principles are not, in Rawls’s view, mere conclusions of abstract reasoning; they are the principles that would be chosen by rational individuals in the original position, and they are the principles that any reasonable conception of justice would endorse. The principles are, in this sense, a renewal of the contractarian tradition in a more rigorous and more contemporary form.
The Critics of Rawls
Rawls’s theory has been the subject of intense debate, and various critics have developed alternative approaches to the foundation of justice.
The libertarian critics, including Robert Nozick, have argued that Rawls’s theory involves an unjustifiable redistribution of wealth, and that the proper foundation of justice is the protection of individual rights, including the right to private property. Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) is the most famous statement of the libertarian critique, and it represents an important alternative to the Rawlsian theory.
The communitarian critics, including Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, and Charles Taylor, have argued that Rawls’s theory is based on a false conception of the individual, and that the proper foundation of justice is the recognition of the social and cultural contexts within which individuals develop their identities and their values. The communitarian critique has been an important contribution to the contemporary debate about justice, and it has helped to produce a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between the individual and the community.
The feminist critics, including Carol Gilligan and others, have argued that Rawls’s theory is based on a male-centered conception of morality, and that the proper foundation of justice is the recognition of the perspectives and experiences of women as well as of men. The feminist critique has been an important contribution to the contemporary debate about justice, and it has helped to produce a more inclusive and more nuanced understanding of the foundations of justice.
The Contemporary Engagement
The contemporary defenders of the social contract tradition emphasize the importance of the principles of consent, equality, and the protection of individual rights. They argue that the contractarian tradition provides the best framework for thinking about the proper relationship between the individual and the state, and that the principles of the tradition are basic to the modern understanding of legitimate political authority.
The contemporary critics of the social contract tradition argue that the tradition is based on a false universalism, that it ignores the historical and cultural specificity of the actual political communities, and that it tends to produce a kind of individualism that is incompatible with the proper recognition of the common good. The critics argue that the contractarian tradition is inadequate to the challenges of contemporary politics, and that a more communitarian or civic-republican framework is needed.
The proper political life, on most contemporary accounts, requires a balance between the insights of the social contract tradition and the insights of its various critics. The social contract tradition provides the principles for the protection of individual rights and the limitation of governmental power; the various critics provide the principles for the recognition of the social and cultural contexts within which individuals develop their identities and their values.
Further Reading
- The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (plato.stanford.edu), relevant entry
- Mark Goldie & Robert Wokler, eds., The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought (2006)
- Terence Ball, Reappraising Political Theory (1995)