Hume on Religion: Skepticism, Faith, and the Limits of Reason
Hume's philosophy of religion: his critique of natural theology, his analysis of miracles, and the modern debate about faith and reason.
David Hume’s philosophy of religion, developed in various essays and in his posthumous Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), is one of the most important and most controversial contributions to the modern debate about the relationship between reason and religion. Hume subjected the natural theology of his time to a withering critical examination, and he developed a comprehensive account of the limits of human reason in matters of religious belief. This article examines the central arguments of Hume’s philosophy of religion, including his critique of natural theology, his analysis of miracles, and his contributions to the modern debate about faith and reason.
The Critique of Natural Theology
The natural theology of the eighteenth century was the attempt to establish the existence and the attributes of God on the basis of reason and the observation of nature, without appeal to special revelation. The two main arguments of the natural theology were the argument from design and the cosmological argument.
The argument from design held that the apparent order and complexity of the natural world pointed to a divine designer. The argument was developed in detail by Robert Boyle, John Ray, and William Paley, and it was widely accepted as a proof of the existence of God.
The cosmological argument held that the existence of the world required a first cause, and that the first cause was God. The argument was developed by various philosophers and theologians, and it was also widely accepted as a proof of the existence of God.
Hume subjected both arguments to a critical examination in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. The Dialogues take the form of a discussion among three characters: Cleanthes, who defends the argument from design; Demea, who defends a more austere, mystical theology; and Philo, the skeptical critic of both.
The argument of the Dialogues is that both arguments for the existence of God are much weaker than the natural theologians had supposed. The argument from design is weakened by the observation that the apparent design in the world could be the result of many causes, and that the inference from observed order to a divine designer is much less certain than the natural theologians had supposed. The cosmological argument is weakened by the observation that the inference from the existence of the world to a first cause is not necessarily valid, and that the existence of the world might be explained in other ways.
The Analysis of Miracles
Hume’s analysis of miracles, developed in Section X of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), is one of the most famous and most controversial arguments in the history of modern philosophy. The argument is that the evidence for any particular miracle is never strong enough to outweigh the evidence for the regularity of nature.
The argument has the structure of a kind of practical inference that Hume developed in the Enquiry, and which is examined in detail in Hume’s Miracles Argument. We weigh the evidence for a miracle against the evidence for the regularity of nature. The evidence for the regularity of nature is much stronger than the evidence for any particular miracle, and therefore we should always reject the testimony for the miracle in favor of the testimony for the regularity of nature.
Hume’s argument has been the subject of intense debate ever since its publication. The defenders of the argument have emphasized the importance of the principle of the regularity of nature, and they have argued that the proper response to a miracle claim is to be skeptical. The critics of the argument have argued that Hume’s principle is self-undermining, and that the proper response to a miracle claim is to weigh the evidence on a case-by-case basis.
The Natural History of Religion
Hume’s Natural History of Religion (1757) is one of the earliest systematic studies of the development of religious belief. The work develops a comprehensive account of the origins of religious belief, and it argues that the religious life of human beings is the result of natural causes rather than divine revelation.
The most important argument of the Natural History is that polytheism, not monotheism, is the original form of religious belief. The earliest human beings, in Hume’s view, worshipped a variety of gods, and the development of monotheism was the result of a long historical process rather than the original state of the religious life.
The argument was an important contribution to the modern study of religion, and it anticipated many of the findings of the modern history of religions. The contemporary debate about the origins of religious belief, about the development of the various religious traditions, and about the proper relationship between the study of religion and the practice of religion has been deeply influenced by Hume’s pioneering work.
The Proper Basis of Religious Belief
Hume’s philosophy of religion is often associated with atheism, but this is not entirely accurate. Hume was skeptical of the rational foundations of religious belief, but he was not himself an atheist in the strict sense of the term. He believed that the proper response to the religious questions was a kind of philosophical humility, recognizing the limits of human reason and the impossibility of demonstrating the truth or falsehood of the major religious claims.
The proper basis of religious belief, in Hume’s view, is not rational demonstration but practical feeling. The religious life is a part of the practical life of human beings, and it is properly based on the sentiments and the practices that have developed in the course of human history. The attempt to ground religious belief in rational demonstration is, in Hume’s view, a mistake, and it leads to the various forms of religious skepticism and religious enthusiasm that have been a feature of the modern period.
The proper response to the religious questions, in Hume’s view, is the cultivation of the sentiments that are appropriate to the religious life — the sense of the divine, the feeling of dependence, the recognition of the limits of human understanding. The rational demonstration of the religious truths is impossible, and the proper response to the religious life is the recognition of this fact and the cultivation of the appropriate sentiments.
The Lasting Influence
Hume’s philosophy of religion has had a profound influence on the development of the modern debate about the relationship between reason and religion. The various works of Hume, including the Enquiry, the Dialogues, and the Natural History, have been a basic reference for the modern debate, and they have been the subject of intense discussion in the centuries since their publication.
The contemporary defenders of Hume’s position emphasize the importance of the skeptical critique of the natural theology, and they argue that the proper response to the religious questions is the recognition of the limits of human reason. The contemporary critics of Hume’s position emphasize the importance of the rational foundations of religious belief, and they argue that the skeptical critique does not do justice to the actual evidence for the religious claims.
Further Reading
- The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (plato.stanford.edu), relevant entry
- The Cambridge Companion to [Thinker] (Cambridge University Press)
- Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (1969)