Thinkers

Hume on the Standard of Taste: Reason, Sentiment, and Aesthetic Judgment

Hume's essay 'Of the Standard of Taste': his account of aesthetic judgment, the role of sentiment, and the conditions of true critics.

David Hume’s essay Of the Standard of Taste (1757) is one of the most important works of modern aesthetics. The essay develops a comprehensive account of aesthetic judgment, the role of sentiment in the determination of the beautiful and the ugly, and the conditions under which genuine aesthetic standards can be established. This article examines the central arguments of the essay, including the role of sentiment, the conditions of aesthetic judgment, and the proper understanding of the standard of taste.

The Diversity of Taste

Hume begins the essay with an observation about the diversity of taste. All human beings, he notes, have the faculty of aesthetic judgment, but the judgments that they make are often very different. What one person finds beautiful, another finds ugly; what one person admires, another despises.

The diversity of taste is a problem for any attempt to establish a universal standard of aesthetic judgment. If taste is purely subjective, then there is no way to adjudicate between the various judgments, and the very idea of a standard of taste becomes incoherent.

Hume does not, however, accept the conclusion that taste is purely subjective. He argues that there are certain universal principles of aesthetic judgment, and that the diversity of taste is the result of various obstacles to the proper application of these principles rather than the absence of the principles themselves.

The Role of Sentiment

The most important feature of Hume’s account of aesthetic judgment is the role of sentiment. Aesthetic judgments, in Hume’s view, are not based on reason but on sentiment. The proper response to a beautiful object is a feeling of pleasure, and the proper response to an ugly object is a feeling of displeasure. The feeling is the basis of the judgment, not the other way around.

The role of sentiment does not mean that aesthetic judgments are arbitrary. Sentiment, in Hume’s view, is a natural human response, and the natural sentiments of human beings are, in important respects, universal. The proper development of the sentiments, through experience and reflection, can lead to the formation of genuine aesthetic standards.

Hume distinguishes between the immediate sentiments of pleasure and displeasure, which are the basis of the aesthetic judgment, and the secondary sentiments, which are the result of the various associations and reflections that have developed in the course of the individual’s life. The immediate sentiments are more universal, while the secondary sentiments are more variable. The proper aesthetic judgment is one that is based on the immediate sentiments, properly corrected by the various associations and reflections that are relevant to the particular work of art.

The Conditions of Aesthetic Judgment

Hume identifies several conditions that are necessary for the proper formation of aesthetic judgment.

The first condition is the proper functioning of the senses. The proper aesthetic judgment requires that the senses be in good working order, and that the individual be able to perceive the object in question with the appropriate clarity and precision.

The second condition is the proper training of the sentiments. The proper aesthetic judgment requires that the individual have had the appropriate experience of the various forms of art, and that the sentiments have been developed through this experience. The individual who has had the appropriate experience is in a better position to make proper aesthetic judgments than the individual who has not.

The third condition is the proper cultivation of the understanding. The proper aesthetic judgment requires that the individual be able to understand the various features of the work of art, including the intentions of the artist, the conventions of the form, and the historical context in which the work was produced.

The fourth condition is the proper freedom from prejudice. The proper aesthetic judgment requires that the individual be free from the various prejudices that can interfere with the proper response to the work of art, including the prejudices of fashion, of custom, of national or religious identity, and of personal interest.

The True Critics

Hume’s account of the conditions of aesthetic judgment leads to his account of the true critics. The true critics, in Hume’s view, are those individuals who have the proper functioning of the senses, the proper training of the sentiments, the proper cultivation of the understanding, and the proper freedom from prejudice.

The true critics are rare, but they are not impossible. The various geniuses of art and criticism — Homer, Virgil, Milton, Shakespeare, the various other great artists and critics of the Western tradition — are the examples of the true critics. Their judgments, in Hume’s view, are the standard by which other judgments are to be evaluated.

The true critics are not, in Hume’s view, infallible. The proper aesthetic judgment is a difficult achievement, and even the true critics can be mistaken. The proper response to the true critics, in Hume’s view, is to take their judgments seriously, but to be willing to challenge them when the evidence requires it.

The Implications for Modern Aesthetics

Hume’s essay has had a profound influence on the development of modern aesthetics. The essay is one of the foundational texts of the modern theory of aesthetic judgment, and it has been the subject of intense debate ever since its publication.

The contemporary defenders of Hume’s account emphasize the importance of sentiment in the determination of the beautiful and the ugly, and they argue that the proper response to the work of art is the cultivation of the natural sentiments of the human being. The contemporary critics of Hume’s account argue that the emphasis on sentiment is insufficient, and that the proper aesthetic judgment requires the application of rational standards that are independent of the natural sentiments.

Further Reading

  • The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (plato.stanford.edu), relevant entry
  • The Cambridge Companion to [Thinker] (Cambridge University Press)
  • Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (1969)