Kant on Autonomy: The Foundation of Moral Agency

Immanuel Kant’s concept of autonomy is one of the central concepts of his moral philosophy, and it is one of the most influential ideas in the history of modern moral thought. Autonomy, for Kant, is the capacity of the moral agent to act in accordance with laws that he has prescribed for himself, rather than in accordance with laws imposed on him from outside. The concept of autonomy is closely connected to the categorical imperative, and it provides the foundation for Kant’s account of the dignity and the value of the moral agent. This article examines the theoretical foundations of Kant’s concept of autonomy, its relation to the categorical imperative, and its lasting influence on modern moral philosophy.

The Definition of Autonomy

Kant defines autonomy as “the property of the will by which it is a law to itself.” The autonomous will is a will that acts in accordance with laws that it has prescribed for itself, rather than in accordance with laws imposed on it by external authorities. The autonomous will is, in this sense, a self-legislating will.

The concept of autonomy is grounded in Kant’s account of the nature of the moral agent. The moral agent, for Kant, is a rational being, capable of acting in accordance with the representation of laws. The moral agent is not merely a passive recipient of laws imposed on him from outside; he is an active source of laws, capable of prescribing laws for himself and of acting in accordance with these laws.

The concept of autonomy is closely connected to the concept of freedom. The autonomous will, for Kant, is the free will: it is a will that is not determined by external causes, but that acts in accordance with laws that it has prescribed for itself. The freedom of the will is, in this sense, the autonomy of the will.

The Autonomy and the Categorical Imperative

The concept of autonomy is closely connected to the categorical imperative, the supreme principle of morality. The categorical imperative, for Kant, is the principle that the moral agent should act only according to that maxim by which he can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. The categorical imperative is, in this sense, the principle of the autonomy of the will: it is the principle that the moral agent should prescribe for himself only those laws that he could will to be universal.

The connection between the categorical imperative and the autonomy of the will is captured in the Formula of Autonomy: “So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxims.” The moral agent, in Kant’s view, is the author of the moral law, and the proper moral life is one in which the agent governs himself by laws that he has prescribed for himself.

The Formula of Autonomy is closely connected to the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends: “Act in accordance with maxims of a universally legislative member of a merely possible kingdom of ends.” The kingdom of ends, for Kant, is a community of rational beings, all of whom are ends in themselves, and all of whom are subject only to laws that they have prescribed for themselves. The proper moral life, on this view, is one in which the moral agent acts as a member of a community of autonomous beings, all of whom are subject only to laws that they have prescribed for themselves.

The Heteronomy of the Will

The opposite of autonomy, for Kant, is heteronomy: the condition of a will that is determined by external causes, rather than by laws that it has prescribed for itself. The heteronomous will is, in Kant’s view, a will that is in bondage to its desires, its appetites, its social conventions, or its religious authorities.

Kant identifies several forms of heteronomy that he considers to be particularly important. The first is the heteronomy of empirical inclination, in which the will is determined by the natural desires and appetites of the agent. The second is the heteronomy of civil authority, in which the will is determined by the laws and conventions of the political community. The third is the heteronomy of religious authority, in which the will is determined by the doctrines and the commands of the religious institutions. The fourth is the heteronomy of moral feeling, in which the will is determined by the feelings of approval or disapproval that the agent experiences in response to actions.

All of these forms of heteronomy, for Kant, are inconsistent with the proper moral life. The proper moral life requires that the agent be autonomous, that he act in accordance with laws that he has prescribed for himself, rather than in accordance with the determinations of external authorities.

The Critique of the Heteronomous Theories

Kant’s account of autonomy is closely connected to his critique of the heteronomous theories of morality that he considers to be inadequate.

The first target of Kant’s critique is the empirical theory of morality, which holds that moral distinctions are derived from the experience of pleasure and pain. The empirical theory, in Kant’s view, is a form of heteronomy, since it grounds morality in the natural desires of the agent, rather than in the autonomous will of the agent.

The second target of Kant’s critique is the rationalist theory of morality, which holds that moral distinctions are derived from the rational nature of the agent. The rationalist theory, in Kant’s view, is also a form of heteronomy, since it grounds morality in the rational nature of the agent as a given, rather than in the autonomy of the agent as a self-legislating will.

The third target of Kant’s critique is the theological theory of morality, which holds that moral distinctions are derived from the will of God. The theological theory, in Kant’s view, is a form of heteronomy, since it grounds morality in the external authority of God, rather than in the autonomy of the moral agent.

The proper theory of morality, for Kant, is one that grounds morality in the autonomy of the will. The moral agent is not determined by external causes; he is the author of the moral law, and the proper moral life is one in which he acts in accordance with laws that he has prescribed for himself.

The Lasting Influence

Kant’s concept of autonomy has had a profound influence on the development of modern moral philosophy. The contemporary deontological tradition, developed by writers such as W. D. Ross, Christine Korsgaard, and Onora O’Neill, has built on Kant’s account of autonomy. The contemporary political philosophy, developed by writers such as John Rawls and the various defenders of liberal constitutionalism, has drawn on Kant’s account of autonomy as the foundation of the proper political life.

The basic insight of Kant — that the proper moral life requires the development of the autonomous moral agent, capable of acting in accordance with laws that he has prescribed for himself — remains a basic commitment of contemporary moral and political thought.

Further Reading

• The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (plato.stanford.edu), relevant entry
• The Cambridge Companion to [Thinker] (Cambridge University Press)
• Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (1969)