Locke's Theory of Religious Toleration: Faith, Coercion, and the Limits of Government

John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) is one of the foundational texts of the modern theory of religious toleration. The work develops a systematic argument that the state has no authority to use force in matters of religious belief, and it became an important source of the modern principles of religious freedom and the separation of church and state. This article examines the central arguments of the Letter and its lasting influence.

The Central Argument

The central argument of the Letter Concerning Toleration is that the proper function of the state is the protection of the civil interests of the citizens, and that the state has no authority to use force in matters of religious belief. The church, for its part, is a voluntary association of believers, and it has no authority to use force against its members or against non-members.

The argument is grounded in three main considerations. First, the proper function of the state is the protection of the “civil interests” of the citizens — their life, liberty, bodily health, and the possession of outward things. The state has no competence to determine the truth of contested religious questions, and it has no authority to coerce the conscience in matters of religious belief.

Second, the church is a voluntary association of believers. The proper end of the church is the salvation of souls, and the means to this end is the persuasion of the heart, not the coercion of the body. The use of force in religious matters is inconsistent with the nature of Christian community, and it is also ineffective: sincere belief cannot be compelled.

Third, the attempt to enforce religious uniformity by force is not only unjust and ineffective, but also counterproductive. It produces hypocrisy rather than sincere belief, and it leads to the corruption of the moral and intellectual life of the community. The proper response to religious error is rational argument, not persecution.

The Limits of Toleration

Locke’s argument for toleration was not absolute. He recognized that there were certain groups that should be excluded from the scope of toleration, and he identified two main categories.

The first category was Catholics. Locke argued that Catholics should not be tolerated because they owed allegiance to a foreign power (the Pope) and because they held that faith did not need to be kept with heretics. The Catholic doctrine, in Locke’s view, was inconsistent with the proper foundation of civil society, and it was therefore not entitled to the protection of the state.

The second category was atheists. Locke argued that atheists should not be tolerated because they could not be trusted to keep their promises and because they undermined the foundations of morality. The atheist, in Locke’s view, was not bound by the moral and religious obligations that were the foundation of civil society.

These limits have been criticized by later writers, and the contemporary principle of religious freedom is much broader than the Lockean version. But the limits were consistent with the principles of the argument: the groups that were excluded were those whose doctrines or practices were thought to be inconsistent with the proper foundation of civil society.

The Influence of the Letter

The Letter Concerning Toleration had a profound influence on the development of the modern theory of religious freedom. The work was translated into French, Dutch, and German, and it was widely read and discussed throughout Europe. The American and French revolutions of the late eighteenth century drew on Locke’s arguments, and the various constitutional guarantees of religious freedom that were developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries draw on the central arguments of the Letter.

The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, drafted by Thomas Jefferson and enacted in 1786, is one of the most important descendants of Locke’s argument. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, with its prohibition of the establishment of religion and its protection of the free exercise of religion, is another important descendant. The contemporary international human rights regime, with its protection of religious freedom in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the various other international covenants, is yet another.

The Continuing Significance

The contemporary challenges to religious toleration are different from those faced by Locke. The contemporary challenges include the proper response to religious extremism, the proper balance between religious freedom and other important rights, the proper relationship between religion and the secular state, and the proper response to the increasing religious diversity of contemporary societies. The engagement with these challenges is, a continuation of the engagement that Locke began in the Letter Concerning Toleration.

The basic commitment of Locke — to the principle that the proper functioning of political life requires the recognition of the rights of religious minorities, and that the attempt to enforce religious uniformity by force is both unjust and ineffective — remains a basic commitment of contemporary democratic thought. The defense of religious freedom remains, a continuation of the Lockean project.

Further Reading

• The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (plato.stanford.edu), relevant entry
• The Cambridge Companion to [Thinker] (Cambridge University Press)
• Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (1969)