Adam Smith on Sympathy: The Moral Sentiments

Adam Smith’s theory of moral sentiments, developed in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), is one of the most important works of the Scottish Enlightenment and one of the foundational texts of modern moral philosophy. The book develops a comprehensive account of the moral life based on the principle of sympathy, and it provides the moral and psychological foundation for Smith’s later economic work. This article examines the central arguments of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, including the role of sympathy, the impartial spectator, and the foundations of moral judgment.

The Role of Sympathy

The central concept of the Theory of Moral Sentiments is sympathy. Sympathy, for Smith, is the natural human capacity to share in the feelings of others. When we see a person in a particular situation, we naturally imagine ourselves in that situation, and we naturally feel some of the same emotions that the person feels.

The sympathy is not, in Smith’s view, a matter of self-interest or of rational calculation. It is a natural human response to the situations of others, and it is the foundation of the moral life. The proper moral life, on Smith’s view, is one in which the natural capacity for sympathy is cultivated and developed.

The sympathy is not, however, an exact replication of the feelings of the other. The person who sympathizes does not actually feel the same intensity of emotion as the person who is observed. The sympathy is a kind of resonance, in which the observer feels some of the same emotions as the observed, but in a more moderate and more manageable form.

The Impartial Spectator

The concept of the impartial spectator is one of the most original features of Smith’s moral philosophy. The impartial spectator is a kind of internal judge, within the mind of each individual, that allows the individual to evaluate his own actions and feelings from a detached and impartial perspective.

The impartial spectator is, in Smith’s view, the foundation of moral judgment. When we judge an action to be right or wrong, we are not merely expressing our own preferences; we are asking what an impartial spectator would think of the action. The impartial spectator, like a kind of internal jury, evaluates the action from a perspective that is not influenced by the particular interests or passions of the individual.

The concept of the impartial spectator was important in the development of the modern theory of moral judgment. The idea that moral judgments are based on a kind of impartial perspective, rather than on the particular preferences of the individual, has been an important feature of the various moral theories that have been developed since the eighteenth century.

The Foundations of Moral Judgment

Smith’s account of the foundations of moral judgment is based on the principles of propriety and merit.

The principle of propriety is the basis for the judgment of the actions of others. An action is judged to be proper or improper depending on whether the agent’s emotions and motives are appropriate to the situation. A person who responds to the suffering of a friend with appropriate sympathy is judged to have acted properly; a person who responds with indifference or cruelty is judged to have acted improperly.

The principle of merit is the basis for the judgment of the consequences of actions. An action is judged to be meritorious or demeritorious depending on whether the consequences of the action are beneficial or harmful. A person who performs an action that benefits others is judged to be meritorious; a person who performs an action that harms others is judged to be demeritorious.

The two principles are connected, but they are not the same. A person can act with the proper emotions and motives but produce harmful consequences, in which case the action is judged to be proper but not meritorious. A person can act with improper emotions and motives but produce beneficial consequences, in which case the action is judged to be improper but meritorious.

The Moral Life

Smith’s account of the moral life is based on the principles of self-command, prudence, justice, and beneficence.

Self-command is the capacity to control one’s passions and to act in accordance with the principles of propriety. The person who has self-command is able to resist the immediate impulses of passion and to act in accordance with the longer-term interests of the moral life.

Prudence is the capacity to look after one’s own interests in a reasonable and effective way. The prudent person is able to balance the immediate pleasures against the longer-term consequences, and to act in a way that is consistent with his own long-term well-being.

Justice is the capacity to respect the rights of others and to refrain from harming them. The just person is able to act in accordance with the principles of justice, even when it is not in his own interest to do so.

Beneficence is the capacity to act for the benefit of others. The beneficent person is able to act in accordance with the principles of beneficence, even when it requires some sacrifice on his own part.

The four virtues are not, in Smith’s view, equally important. Justice is the most important, because it is the foundation of the social order. Beneficence is the most admirable, because it is not required by the rules of justice. Prudence is the most useful, because it is necessary for the proper management of one’s own affairs. Self-command is the most fundamental, because it is the foundation of the other three.

The Connection to The Wealth of Nations

The Theory of Moral Sentiments provides the moral and psychological foundation for Smith’s later economic work, the Wealth of Nations. The human being of the Theory of Moral Sentiments is not the purely self-interested “economic man” of later economic theory; he is a complex creature with natural sympathies, with a sense of justice, and with a desire for the approval of others.

The connection between the two works is important for the proper understanding of Smith’s economic thought. The “invisible hand” of the Wealth of Nations is not a defense of selfishness or of the unrestrained pursuit of private interest; it is a description of a tendency that operates within a moral framework in which the natural sympathies and the sense of justice of the human being are taken into account.

Further Reading

• The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (plato.stanford.edu), relevant entry
• The Cambridge Companion to [Thinker] (Cambridge University Press)
• Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (1969)